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reiterated demand for his resignation, and his humiliation at the post-mortem honors which William thrust upon him. The pen-picture of Caprivi which follows is touched with the bitterness of a quarter-century of feud with the army chiefs; that of William II. is a comparison, measured and judicial, but none the less satirical in undertone, of the kaiser with his forbears on the Prussian throne, culminating in an arraignment for lack of loyalty to tried servants: "With the transition from the Hohenzollern spirit to the Coburg-English conception an imponderable factor was lost which will be difficult to restore" (p. 151).

Bismarck's story is of deep psychological interest both for the light it throws on his own character and on that of William, but it adds little to our knowledge of the events. Equally important for these, and to be read in connection with Bismarck's account, is the recently published posthumous *apologia* of K. H. von Boetticher (*Fürst Bismarcks Entlassung*, Berlin, Scherl, 1920). Here the dismissal of the chancellor is reviewed from the standpoint of a pliant though conscientious bureaucrat, with the inclusion of many private and public papers of a confidential sort, not accessible to Bismarck in his retirement.

Two points in the present work will be examined by the student of recent German history with especial interest. Regarding the first, the book offers confirmation that, in spite of all denial by Bismarck's biographers, the chancellor's reactionary attitude toward the Socialists must have eventually led to something like a *coup d'état* against the Federal Constitution. He had come to the point where he viewed the Socialist danger as "no longer a legal question but a matter of civil war and internal power" (p. 48). Like confirmation is given in the other significant point, the fundamental difference of opinion between the kaiser, under army influences, and Bismarck as to the value of Russia's friendship. By a "caprice of fortune" Schuvalov presented his credentials to negotiate for a treaty (a renewal of the *Rückversicherungsvertrag*, which lapsed in June, 1890) on the day on which Bismarck sent in his resignation. He was authorized to deal only with Bismarck or his son, not their successors (p. 123).

ROBERT HERNDON FIFE.

*Recollections of a Foreign Minister: Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky.* Translated by CHARLES LOUIS SEEGER. (Garden City, N. Y., and Toronto: Doubleday, Page, and Company. 1921. Pp. xv, 303. \$2.50.)

M. IZVOLSKI was a *diplomate de carrière*. After holding diplomatic positions in the Balkans, Washington, Rome, Munich, Tokio, and Copenhagen, he became Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1906-1910, and then ambassador at Paris until 1917. But anyone who expects to find any revelations about Russian foreign affairs in this book will be disap-

pointed. Most of the chapters, slightly modified, were published, though it is nowhere so stated, in 1919, either in the *Fortnightly Review* or in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. In the chapter on the Secret Treaty of Björkö, the only chapter dealing primarily with foreign affairs, the author takes issue with some of Dr. Dillon's statements, especially with the view that the secret treaty was directed against France, whereas in reality it was directed against England, or at least against the Anglo-French Entente; otherwise there is little in this chapter which was not already known to readers of the *American Historical Review*.

Though disappointing to the student of diplomatic history, M. Izvolski's volume is interesting and valuable as a revelation of himself and as an intimate picture of political cross-currents and personalities in Russia in the years 1905-1907—the period when Russia was taking her first tottering steps in constitutional government. As one of the progressive provincial nobility, with wide culture and superior social connections (of which he was not unaware), he took an active part, in addition to his burdens as foreign minister, in all Russia's difficult domestic problems. He opposed on principle the reactionary slavophilism and narrowness of the bureaucrats. He deplored the combination of heterogeneous elements in the Witte and Goremykin cabinets, rightly preferring a homogeneous cabinet, made up of "liberals" like himself, or even of Cadets. But the bureaucratic influence was too strong and the tsar too weak to secure the solidarity of such a cabinet. In the composition of the First Duma, Izvolski thought Witte made a great mistake to include such a large proportion of peasants; instead of being a conservative support to monarchy through their supposed loyalty to the Little Father, as had been hoped, a good part of these peasants soon demanded expropriation of the land—the rock on which the First Duma was wrecked.

Among the author's admirable portraits of the leaders of the period—Lamsdorff, Goremykin, Stolypin, Miliukov, Trepov, and the tsar himself—the most complete and discriminating is that of Witte. Never falling under the glamor of Witte's powerful personality, yet never sharing the violent aversion which the "self-made man" inspired in so many Russian nobles, M. Izvolski seeks to balance fairly the great achievements and the political and moral weaknesses of the man who was in some respects his rival. He criticizes particularly Witte's tendency, as finance minister, to extend state control over railroads, industry, and commerce, and thus build up for himself a kind of personal civil service constituting a state within a state. This exaggerated *étatisme* tended to kill individual initiative and the healthy growth of local self-government through the *zemstvos*, which was Izvolski's own ideal. Moreover, he says, Witte's financial agents attached to the Russian embassies abroad, corresponding in cipher with the finance minister and acting independently of their nominal diplomatic chiefs, often main-

tained political ideas opposed to those of official Russian diplomacy. But he gives no specific examples to confirm this sweeping statement.

SIDNEY B. FAY.

*The Merchant Navy.* By ARCHIBALD HURD. Volume I. [History of the Great War based on Official Documents, by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence.] (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1921. Pp. xiv, 473. \$7.50.)

THE Historical Section of the British Committee of Imperial Defence, under the editorship of Sir Julian Corbett, divided the work of writing the history of the Great War into three parts. The first treats of the active operations of the Royal Navy itself, about which Sir Julian is now writing four and perhaps five volumes with his own pen, one of which has already appeared (*Naval Operations*, vol. I.). The second concerns the economic effects of the naval war on ocean-borne trade, and is in the competent hands of Mr. C. Ernest Fayle, whose first volume has already appeared (*Seaborne Trade*, vol. I.) and was noticed in the April number of this *Review* (XXVI. 531). It will comprise several further volumes.

The work now under discussion has for its subject the activities of the merchant fleet of Great Britain, and forms the third category of the general war history. As Mr. Hurd says, the British merchant seamen, on account of the piratical policy of the German admiralty, were forced by circumstances, over which neither they nor the British naval authorities had any control, into the forefront of the struggle by sea.

They had entered the Mercantile Marine with no thought that they would be exposed even to such trials and sufferings as their predecessors sustained during the previous Great War, for there had been much talk at various international Conferences of ameliorating the conditions of warfare; they found themselves involved in a conflict waged by a merciless enemy with large and newly developed resources. The seamen were defenceless, for this emergency had not been foreseen either by the Admiralty, by the shipowners, or by the seamen themselves. . . .

The ordeal to which the men of the British Mercantile Marine submitted with generous patriotism can be appreciated only if it is described in an appropriate setting, ignoring neither the plans of the naval authorities for the protection of merchant shipping, elaborated in the years before the outbreak of the war, nor the measures afterwards adopted to enable merchant shipping to resist with better hope of success the enemy's policy.

The book comprises an account of the operations of the Auxiliary Patrol, which was practically a new navy called into being at the admiralty's invitation, and the history of which Mr. Hurd rightly calls "one of the most remarkable aspects of the war by sea".

The feature of all these volumes published by the British Historical